Problem
Security and legal teams increasingly won’t sign off on an LLM deployment without evidence of adversarial testing. The evidence they want is not a list of jailbreaks that worked. It’s: which OWASP categories are failing, how reliably, with what proof, and what to do about it. Every design decision serves that output.
System
aegis scan --target <endpoint> --authorize runs the full pipeline. Probes carry payloads per OWASP LLM category; each response goes through a two-stage evaluator (cheap heuristics first, then a classifier for the ambiguous cases); results roll up per category with pass rates and evidence; the report generator writes the executive PDF and the machine-readable formats for CI.
Worth knowing
Canary-based detection instead of harm elicitation. The naive way to test a jailbreak is to ask for something harmful and see if the model complies, which produces a corpus of harmful output and an evaluator that has to judge harm. Aegis plants canary strings and tests whether the guardrails leak them, so success is detected by string presence, not by a judgment call. It’s more reliable and doesn’t fill your reports with the thing you were trying to prevent.
The --authorize flag is deliberate: the tool refuses to run against a target without an explicit assertion that you’re allowed to test it.